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Was It Science, Not Religion? 
MAIMON SCHWARZSCHILD* 
Does freedom of conscience, and perhaps freedom of thought generally,
have religious roots?  Ronald Beiner’s Three Versions of the Politics of 
Conscience: Hobbes, Spinoza, Locke traces the idea of conscience as a
factor in Western political thought to ideas that crystallized in the
seventeenth century.  Beiner examines three leading seventeenth century
thinkers—Hobbes, Spinoza, and Locke—to explore whether conscience,
or rather the idea of freedom of conscience, was specifically a religious
imperative for these thinkers: whether their religious commitments or 
their respect for religious integrity underlay and motivated their ideas
about freedom of conscience. 
Beiner argues that for Hobbes and Spinoza the answer is no.1  Beiner
claims that it was intellectual freedom, specifically scientific or
philosophical freedom, that was important for Hobbes and Spinoza.2 
Freedom of religious conscience was at best a subset of Spinoza’s
concern for intellectual freedom;3 religious conscience might not have
been Hobbes’s concern at all or even the object of much sympathy on his
part.4  Beiner acknowledges that Locke’s A Letter Concerning Toleration
really does seem to be specifically about religious freedom, but Beiner 
tries to suggest that even Locke’s argument for toleration was implicitly
* Professor of Law, University of San Diego School of Law. 
1. See Ronald Beiner, Three Versions of the Politics of Conscience: Hobbes, 
Spinoza, Locke, 47 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1107, 1109, 1116 (2010). 
2. Id. at 1109. 
3. Id. at 1116, 1118. 
4. See id. at 1109. 
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broader, whether consciously or not, than purely an argument for religious
toleration.5 
It seems to me that Beiner underestimates—if he does not
misunderestimate—the importance of religion for these thinkers and
anachronistically recasts their concerns in terms of today’s preoccupations
and preconceptions.6 
Beiner begins with Hobbes.  Hobbes is famously, or notoriously, a 
theorist of sovereignty, not of free conscience, so one might expect Hobbes
to support the power, and right, of the sovereign to command religious 
conformity.  And indeed, Hobbes says that the State can and should 
prescribe uniform “Publique Worship.”7 But Beiner puts the emphasis on 
Hobbes’s adjective or qualification—“publique”—rather than on Hobbes’s 
endorsement of compulsory religious uniformity as such.8  “What counts is
the imperative of shared participation in political authority—not what
people actually believe—so a public display of loyalty to the civil cult
suffices; deeper scrutiny of inner convictions is beside the point.”9  “Private,
is in secret Free,”10 in Hobbes’s words; “the very Thoughts, and
Consciences of Men,” says Hobbes, should not be violated.11  The Spanish 
Inquisition horrified Hobbes,12 as it horrifies us today, by trying to do so.
Beiner reads Hobbes as distinguishing intellectual freedom from religious 
fanaticism.  Intellectual freedom, specifically freedom of natural science,
should not be intruded on by the state because its exercise is private, or
rather, restricted to a responsible elite, and hence no threat to the
Commonwealth.  Religious fanaticism, on the other hand, is a dangerous
perversion of “conscience,” which the state should suppress, at least in
its public manifestations. 
Beiner is persuasive that Hobbes defended, or at least accepted, freedom 
of private thought but not freedom of fanatical, divisive, and irrational 
religion; Hobbes feared the consequences of such religion, having witnessed 
5. See id. at 1123. 
6. See generally Richard H. Popkin, The Religious Background of Seventeenth-
Century Philosophy, 25 J. HIST. PHIL. 35, 47 (1987) (“[I]f one wants to understand the 
major or minor seventeenth-century thinkers as historical figures struggling with the 
problems of their time, then I think one has to delve into their context, and not just ours.
When one does, one finds a major aspect of their context is the religious issues involved
with what we now isolate as philosophical issues.”). 
 7. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 252–53 (Richard Tuck ed., Cambridge Univ. 
Press Rev. Student Ed. 1996) (1651). 
8. See Beiner, supra note 1, at 1110 (quoting HOBBES, supra note 7, at 252–53). 
 9. Beiner, supra note 1, at 1111. 
 10. HOBBES, supra note 7, at 249. 
11. See id. at 471. 
12. See id. at 471–72. 
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and barely survived them in his own time.  But after all, the distinction 
between public and private belief was hardly original to Hobbes. It was a
standard Enlightenment and even earlier perception— or misapprehension 
—of the Greco-Roman attitude toward religion: that the Greco-Roman
pagan cults were a matter of public ritual and no doubt believed by the
ignorant but privately mocked and disbelieved by the sophisticated
members of the elite. It was almost a cliché of Renaissance and
Enlightenment thought to admire this classical attitude or alleged
attitude.13 
But as for Beiner’s distinction between religion as such, which he
suggests Hobbes might have thought a perversion of conscience, and
natural science, which Beiner suggests was the real area of conscience
about whose freedom Hobbes cared: Beiner offers little or no evidence 
that Hobbes distinguished scientific knowledge from other kinds of 
knowledge or thought.  Hobbes’s contemporary Isaac Newton certainly
made no such distinction.14  It seems to me that Hobbes would have 
associated legitimate—and rightly free—conscience with all the thinking 
and research of rational, discrete, classically minded men.  This would 
have included their religious convictions too.  The important distinction,
for Hobbes, would have been between responsible members of the elite 
on the one hand and fanatics and enthusiasts on the other.  It is no doubt
conventional in the twenty-first century to distinguish more or less 
sharply between religious and scientific ideas.  It was not so in the 
seventeenth century, even for so unorthodox a thinker as Hobbes.  Indeed, 
13. Gibbon expressed the Enlightenment view elegantly: “The various modes of
worship which prevailed in the Roman world were all considered by the people as 
equally true; by the philosopher, as equally false; and by the magistrate, as equally
useful.”  EDWARD GIBBON, THE DECLINE AND FALL OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 19 (Hans-
Friedrich Mueller ed., Modern Library 2003) (1776).  There is a trend in recent 
scholarship to suggest that the Greeks and Romans, even the elites, took their pagan 
religions more seriously. See, e.g., ZSUZSANNA VÁRHELYI, THE RELIGION OF SENATORS
IN THE ROMAN EMPIRE 46 (2010). 
14. See James J. Bono, From Paracelsus to Newton: The Word of God, the Book of 
Nature, and the Eclipse of the “Emblematic World View,” in  NEWTON AND RELIGION:
CONTEXT, NATURE, AND INFLUENCE 45, 74–75 (James E. Force & Richard H. Popkin 
eds., 1999); James E. Force, Newton, the “Ancients,” and the “Moderns,” in  NEWTON
AND RELIGION: CONTEXT, NATURE, AND INFLUENCE, supra, at 237, 241; Sarah Hutton, 
The Seven Trumpets and the Seven Vials: Apocalypticism and Christology in Newton’s 
Theological Writings, in  NEWTON AND RELIGION: CONTEXT, NATURE, AND INFLUENCE,
supra, at 165, 165; G.A.J. Rogers, Newton and the Guaranteeing God, in NEWTON AND
RELIGION: CONTEXT, NATURE, AND INFLUENCE, supra, at 221, 234. 
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Hobbes’s own thinking might not have been as thoroughly atheistic as 
Beiner might hope.15 
Turning to Spinoza, Beiner reads Spinoza as saying that it is ultimately
impossible to coerce people’s inner beliefs and therefore that there is no 
right to do so, including no right on the part of the state.16  Beiner argues, 
rightly I think, that this is consistent with Spinoza’s general position that 
right is really might: that nature—the “is”—and what is right—the “ought”
—are one.17  Deus sive Natura in Spinoza’s Latin phrase: “God is nature.”18 
Beiner—again rightly I think—adds that Spinoza’s emphasis on the futility
of coercing private belief is really a pretty weak argument on Spinoza’s 
part.19  We know today from totalitarian states and totalitarian movements
that people’s convictions can be extensively altered or manipulated. 
But seemingly independent of whether it is possible and hence proper 
to coerce people’s thoughts, Spinoza also writes about the importance of
the human “faculty to reason freely and form [one’s] own judgment,”20 
and Spinoza notes that Amsterdam has prospered by being a tolerant
place21—which indeed it was, perhaps uniquely so in its time.  Spinoza 
himself was a philosopher, of course, and he was subjected to pressure
during his lifetime, not so much by the state as by the Jewish community
of Amsterdam, in part because of his ideas.22  Hence Beiner argues that 
intellectual freedom, especially philosophical freedom, is what Spinoza 
really cared about; religious freedom might be an important subset of 
that but still ultimately only a subset.23 As between Hobbes, Locke, and 
Spinoza, Beiner’s case is perhaps strongest for Spinoza. 
Locke’s A Letter Concerning Toleration was explicitly a brief for 
religious toleration.  Hence it does not conform to Beiner’s thesis that
freedom of scientific or philosophical thought—not free exercise of
15. See Criseyda Cox, Thomas Hobbes—Was He an Atheist?, HIST. REV., Dec.
1998, at 28; see also A.P. MARTINICH, THE TWO GODS OF LEVIATHAN: THOMAS HOBBES 
ON RELIGION AND POLITICS 1, 14–15, 32–34 (1992) (arguing that Hobbes was an
orthodox Calvinist). 
16. See Beiner, supra note 1, at 1116–17. 
17. See id. at 1118–19. 
18. See Carlos Fraenkel, Maimonides’ God and Spinoza’s Deus sive Natura, 44 J.
HIST. PHIL. 169, 170–73, 193–98 (2006) (linking Spinoza with Maimonides’s medieval 
Jewish Aristotelianism); but cf. JOSÉ FAUR, IN THE SHADOW OF HISTORY: JEWS AND 
CONVERSOS AT THE DAWN OF MODERNITY 142–75 (1992) (arguing that Spinoza’s thought 
was implicitly totalitarian and deeply anti-Jewish).
19. See Beiner, supra note 1, at 1117. 
 20. BARUCH SPINOZA, THEOLOGICAL-POLITICAL TREATISE 230 (Samuel Shirley
trans., Hackett Publ’g Co. 1998) (1670). 
21.  See id. at 236. 
22. See FAUR, supra note 18, at 148. 
23. See Beiner, supra note 1, at 1118. 
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religion—was the paramount concern for the leading seventeenth century 
political philosophers.  Beiner in effect concedes this, while suggesting, 
plausibly enough, that some points of Locke’s argument would implicitly
support freedom of conscience more generally, not merely freedom of
religious conscience.24 
It seems to me that Beiner underestimates what was special about 
religion, certainly for Locke but also for Spinoza and perhaps for Hobbes as
well: that what is at stake for religious people is unique.  Obeying the 
will of God, salvation of one’s eternal soul, is bigger and hence different
than whatever is typically at stake for other kinds of thinking, even for 
natural scientists or intellectuals who care deeply about their work. 
Religious convictions have unique importance to those who hold them; if 
coerced to abandon or change their convictions, believers are especially 
apt to resist, even violently.  Coerced religion is no religion at all, says
Locke,25 and Spinoza hints at the same by insisting that it is impossible 
to coerce people’s inner religious convictions.26  If religious belief is
different and if Locke’s, Spinoza’s, and even Hobbes’s ideas about free 
thought sprang from the collision of religious convictions in the 
religious wars of their day, then there is some difficulty for Beiner’s
thesis that what these thinkers really cared about was freedom of natural
science and that what was uniquely at stake in religious conviction for
religious people was not after all the inspiration of these thinkers’—and
perhaps our own—commitment to freedom of conscience.
 24. See id. at 1123. 
25. See JOHN LOCKE, A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION 38 (James H. Tully ed.,
Hackett Publ’g Co. 1983) (1689). 
26. See SPINOZA, supra note 20, at 230 (“But . . . it is impossible for the mind to be 
completely under another’s control . . . .”). 
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